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This paper argues that Gary Becker has been a leader in the economics of 
marriage not only as a pioneer but also as a leader who influenced the work of other 
economists who entered this field over at least two decades. A comprehensive survey of 
economic research on marriage is presented for the years 1970-1993. A distinction is 
drawn between earlier entrants and later entrants, the dividing line being 1980, 
coinciding with the publication of Becker’s seminal Treatise on the Family. In his first 
article on marriage in the JPE in 1973, Becker gave more prominence to Demand & 
Supply [D&S] models than he later did in the Treatise. It appears that a similar 
movement away from D&S models is observed among later entrants. This is but one 
indication of Becker’s leadership in the economics of marriage in the period 1980-1993. 
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1 This paper has benefited from comments by Patricia Apps, Gary Becker, Mario Blejer, Carmel Chiswick, 
Scott Drewianka, Valerio Filoso, Sarah Hamersma, Lawrence Kenny, Bertrand Lemennicier, Ronald 
Mincy, Catherine Sofer, Yoram Weiss, Robert Willis, and Howard Yourow.    2
 
I. Introduction 
If academics generate intellectual products, then fields of inquiry are intellectual 
industries. Some industries have a Bill Gates, who not only pioneers the industry but also 
continues to exert considerable influence over its production for a prolonged period of 
time. Other industries develop without much leadership from a single individual or firm, 
or if one producer dominates, leadership does not last very long.  
How influential are pioneers in research fields in economics? This paper 
examines the degree of leadership that Gary Becker has exercised over the economics of 
marriage, a research field he pioneered in the 1970s. It is argued here that his influence 
over this field of inquiry was considerable, at least until 1993, the year this study ends. 
When he broke new ground in the study of marriage, at Columbia in the late 
1960s, Becker faced little competition. He had already acquired considerable stature in 
more conventional areas of economics, including labor economics and consumer 
economics, and by the time the theory of marriage was first published, in 1973, he had  
moved to Chicago and become one of the mastheads of the Chicago School of 
economics. In those early years, competition from other economic theorists was very 
limited, as few considered marriage part of the scope of economics. In the 1960s and 
1970s Becker was one of the few theorists engaging in what is now called ‘freakonomics’ 
(a term coined recently by Steve Levitt and Stephen Dubner 2005).  
Becker’s standing in the economics profession grew in the 1970s and 1980s. Even 
though he did not win the Nobel prize until 1992--towards the end of the period under 
study here--Becker’s growing influence in the U.S. and abroad during the period under 
study was being recognized in other ways, including Business Week’ s invitation to 
become a regular columnist in 1985. In becoming a spokesman for the Chicago School of 
economics, Becker followed in the footsteps of his mentor, Milton Friedman, who had 
earned the Nobel prize in 1976 and reached a broad audience via Newsweek columns and 
his popular books, Capitalism and Freedom and Free to Choose.
2 Becker’s rising fame 
did not stop other economists from trying to gain more influence over the economics of 
marriage, as documented in section III.   
This paper offers indications of the extent of Becker’s intellectual leadership in 
economics of marriage by comparing the contents of other economists’ writings on this 
topic with Becker’s own publications on the economics of marriage. The analysis focuses 
on Becker’s two major works on the economics of marriage: a set of two articles 
published in the Journal of Political Economy (JPE) in 1973-74, and selected chapters in 
his 1981 book Treatise on the Family.
3 Within the relatively short period 1973-1981, 
Becker made substantial changes to the presentation of his theory of marriage. Changes 
in Becker’s perspective on marriage appear to have led to changes in other economists’ 
writings on marriage. This paper reports on much of the economic literature on marriage 
published in the period 1973-1980 and in the twelve years after the publication of 
Becker’s Treatise.  
In Section II, I review Becker’s theory of marriage (BTM). It is shown that 
Demand and Supply (D&S) models played a more prominent role in the JPE articles than 
                                                 
2 Friedman encouraged Becker to accept Business Week’s invitation (see Becker and  Guity Nashat Becker 
1997). 
3 A second edition of the Treatise was published in 1992.  It is not very different from the first edition.   3
in the Treatise. Section III examines the evolution of models of marriage by other 
economists. A distinction is made between the publications of earlier entrants into the 
field of economics of marriage, i.e. researchers who entered in the 1970s, before Becker 
published his Treatise, and the publications of later entrants who entered the field in the 
1980s and early 1990s. Until the Treatise was published, D&S models predominated not 
only in Becker’s writings, but also in other economists’ writings on the topic. After the 
Treatise appeared in 1981, optimal sorting and bargaining models of marriage became 
popular relative to D&S models of marriage. It is argued that the growth of both optimal 
sorting and bargaining models indicates Becker’s persistent influence on economic 
analyses of marriage during the period under study. The paper concludes with tentative 
comparisons between the extent of Becker’s influence on a number of different fields of 
novel research of interest to economists as well as non-economists.  
 
II. Becker’s D&S models of marriage: 1973 to 1981 
Except for a relatively inconsequential note by Martin Bronfenbrenner (1971) that 
used D&S analysis, Becker pioneered the economic analysis of marriage. Becker’s theory 
of marriage (BTM) first appeared in two articles entitled ‘A Theory of Marriage’, 
originally published in the Journal of Political Economy (JPE) in 1973-74, and then in a 
book, the Treatise on the Family, originally published in 1981. In Becker’s Treatise on 
the Family published in 1981 marriage market models appear principally in chapters 3 
(Polygamy and Monogamy in Marriage Markets) and 4 (Assortative Mating in Marriage 
Markets). The sections on marriage were reproduced without any changes in the second 
edition of the Treatise, published in 1992. 
Both the 1973 and the 1981 versions of BTM contain two types of marriage 
market models: D&S models and optimal sorting models.
 4 With Robert T. Michael and 
Elizabeth Landes, Becker also co-authored an article on the economics of divorce that 
appeared in the JPE in 1977, but the bulk of the discussion below regards the 1973 JPE 
articles and the 1981 Treatise.  
Economic models are meant to resolve three basic economic problems: allocation 
of factors of production, production, and distribution. D&S models and optimal sorting 
models of marriage have a number of points in common: they consider individuals as 
rational optimizers and make an analogy between marriages and firms.
5 Both types of 
model address the basic economic problem of allocation: in this case the allocation (or 
sorting) of men and women into matches. Both types of model also recognize that 
markets play a role in facilitating this sorting into matches. Optimal sorting models are 
more general than D&S models in the sense that they focus on the sorting result, namely 
the very best allocation of men and women into matches, and tend to be vague about the 
sorting process.
6 D&S models of marriage are more specific about this process, in that 
                                                 
4 In Grossbard-Shechtman (2003) I called these two versions of BTM the marriage market model and the 
matching model, but these are inappropriate terms: D&S models deal with matching, and matching models 
are about the sorting of men and women participating in the same marriage markets. See Catherine Sofer 
and Michel Sollogoub (1992) and Michael Brien and Michelle Seran (2003) for other classifications of 
Becker’s marriage models.  
5 In that sense, BTM has to be understood in the context of the New Home Economics pioneered by Becker 
and Jacob Mincer while both were at Columbia (see Grossbard-Shechtman 2001a). 
6 Some sorting models are closer to D&S models than others. Matching models in the tradition of David 
Gale and Lloyd Shapley’s (1962) ‘stable marriage problem’ are further from D&S models than Tjalling   4
they emphasize the essential role of a price mechanism. This mechanism also lies at the 
basis of search models of marriage. In these search models that complement D&S 
models, a price mechanism (or quasi-price mechanism) helps obtain a sorting result 
between a person on the demand side and a person on the supply side. Becker is also one 
of the major contributors to search theories of marriage (in Becker, Landes and Michael 
1977 and in the Treatise), and the first to apply Mortensen’s search models to marriage 
was Michael Keeley, a student of Becker, in Keeley (1974). 
Optimal sorting models and D&S models also differ in the degree to which they 
help resolve the other two basic economic problems of production and distribution. 
Optimal sorting models don’t deal with distribution. Therefore, if optimal sorting models 
are used to explain allocation, other models such as bargaining models are needed to 
resolve distribution problems.
 7  One reason that bargaining models of marriage have 
flourished since the 1980s is that complements to optimal sorting models were 
increasingly needed as the use of optimal sorting models expanded.
  
A major advantage of D&S models based on the operation of a price mechanism 
and competition lies in these models’ capacity to  simultaneously and parcimoniously 
resolve problems of allocation, production, and distribution. A disadvantage of D&S 
models is their lack of generality: the models need stronger assumptions than most 
alternative models of optimal sorting and bargaining, including the assumption that a 
price mechanism operates and assumptions guaranteeing some degree of competition 
(such as homogeneity, ease of entry and exit, and large number of participants). 
While D&S models of marriage markets play an important role in explaining 
sorting into marriages in both versions of BTM, the first version of the theory is quite 
different from the second version, published 8 years later. This section compares the JPE 
articles and the two main chapters on marriage in the Treatise in terms of the centrality of 
D&S models. While there is much in common between the theory of marriage that 
Becker published in the 1970s in the JPE and in 1981 in the Treatise, there are also 
fundamental differences in the prominence of D&S models in the two versions of the 
theory. 
What the two versions of D&S models of marriage in BTM have in common.  
In both versions of BTM graphic presentations of D&S models of marriage play a 
prominent role. In emphasizing D&S models of marriage, Becker follows the Chicago 
tradition of preference for the price mechanism over the command mechanism of 
organization. Prices in Becker’s D&S models of marriage are mostly implicit prices, 
although he recognizes that some societies also have explicit prices for brides or grooms. 
From the perspective of distribution, prices are closely related to incomes. Becker 
typically phrases his discussions of implicit prices in terms of shares of the gain from 
marriage received by men or women, or as the equilibrium income [from marriage] that 
men and women obtain. Within the framework of D&S models, it follows that any 
discussion of distribution of gains or income recognizes that prices play a role in the 
allocation of resources inside the unit of production, in this case a married household.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Koopmans and Martin Beckmann’s (1957) which they called ‘assignment problems’. I owe this point to 
Valerio Filoso. 
7 I am using the term ‘bargaining model’ to categorize all models that deal with the distribution of goods 
and resources inside a marriage. This includes models about agency in marriage such as Weiss and Willis 
(1985) and collective models such as Chiappori (1988).   5
The same basic competitive D&S model of marriage appears both in the JPE 
article and the Treatise (see Figure 1 in Becker 1973 and Figure 3.1 in Becker 1981). It 
assumes that identical men and identical women are in the market for one another. As a 
couple, a man and a woman can produce a vector of goods Zmf (with homogeneity of 
men and women this gain was assumed to be the same for all couples) that exceeds the 
sum of the Zf a woman could produce alone and the Zm that a man could produce alone. 
The market then determines how the total gain from marriage Zmf – Zm – Zf  is 
subdivided between husband and wife. Graphically, this is presented as a market for 
wives, with the supply being a horizontal line equal to Zf for every woman in the market. 
The supply becomes vertical and rises when the market runs out of women. The demand 
by men is established as a horizontal line equal to Zmf – Zm, the maximum that men are 
willing to pay women to marry them (i.e. women get the entire gain from marriage). The 
demand becomes vertical and falls when the market runs out of men. It follows from this 
market analysis that if the number of men exceeds the number of women, i.e. the sex 
ratio exceeds one, the entire gain from marriage goes to women. If the number of women 
exceeds the number of men, the entire gain from marriage goes to men. If the number of 
men and women are the same, the market does not determine the division of the gains 
from marriage. Bargaining leads to the establishment of a lower limit for women’s 
market compensation at Zf (with the entire gain going to men), and an upper limit at 
Zmf – Zm (with the entire gain going to women). As has been recognized by Becker, this 
model does not determine how gains from marriage would be distributed between 
husbands and wives, an indeterminacy that opens a door to bargaining theories of 
marriage, in which men and women use command mechanisms to determine the division 
of marital output.
 8  
Where the two versions of D&S models of marriage in BTM differ. 
The two versions of BTM differ in the extent to which they cover D&S models 
and optimal sorting models. More specifically, the following differences are noteworthy. 
 
•  Different use of explicit language steeped in price theory. In the JPE 
article of 1973 the role of prices in the model is clearly stated, as in the 
following passage: “Each marriage can be considered a two-person firm 
with either member being the ‘entrepreneur’ who ‘hires’ the other at the 
salary mij or fij and receives residual ‘profits’ (…). Another interpretation 
of the optimal sorting is that only it enables each ‘entrepreneur’ to 
maximize ‘profits’ for given ‘salaries’ of mates…With all other sortings, 
some ‘entrepreneurs’ could do better by ‘hiring’ different mates than those 
assigned to them.”  
 
Here is another example of the role of prices in the 1973 article: “…the ‘shadow’ price of 
an hour of  tf [female household production time] to a single M [male]—the price he 
would be willing to pay for tf —would exceed wf [the female wage], and the ‘shadow’ 
price of an hour of tm [male household production time] to a single F [female]—the price 
she would be willing to pay for tm—would exceed wm [the male wage]. Both gain from 
marriage because M then, in effect, can buy an hour of tf  at wf and F can buy an hour of 
tm  at wm , lower prices they then would be willing to pay. Of course this is also why 
                                                 
8 Oral communication some time in the period 1974-1976.   6
married households use positive amounts of t f  and tm.”  These sentences clearly 
emphasize the role of price in a demand for labor. This is about demand as the 
willingness to pay for an hour of a spouse’s household production time. In other words, 
Becker writes that the implicit wage of a woman in marital production may exceed the 
opportunity cost of her time as measured by her wage in the labor force. 
 
•  Different graphs of D&S of mates. In addition to this basic D&S model of 
marriage common to both venues, the two publications contain more 
graphical D&S models of marriage markets, but different models appear 
in the 1973 and 1981 versions of BTM. In 1973 there is a market for men 
of type i and women of type i which assumes that people can substitute 
between different types of spouses (Figure 2), and in 1981 there are more 
markets with polygyny (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Becker’s omission of the 
second marriage market model in the Treatise is very interesting and 
worth further investigation.  
 
The second graphic D&S model presented in Becker’s 1973 JPE article models choice 
between mates of different types, in contrast to the first model that assumed 
homogeneous men and homogeneous women. This model is therefore most relevant to 
complex societies like ours. In this model, supply and demand takes account of possible 
substitution between mates belonging to a continuum of different types. Becker shows 
that in these circumstances the equilibrium division of output in marriage can fall 
anywhere between the best division from a male point of view and the best division from 
a female point of view (Figure 2). This graph does not appear in the Treatise. This is a 
fact that has puzzled me for years.  
One of the advantages of studying the thoughts of a living economist is that one 
can ask him questions. In a 2004 email exchange between us, this is what Becker had to 
say about the disappearance of the D&S model with heterogeneous men and women from 
the 1981 version of BTM: “My Treatise was considered by me to be a complement to my 
previous work, not a substitute. So I did not go over everything in the earlier papers that I 
considered to be valid and sometimes even important.” (Becker, 2004) In that same 
exchange, Becker was very clear that he had not changed his mind about the validity and 
applicability of the D&S model that appeared as Figure 2 in his JPE article on marriage: 
“I never abandoned my view that imputations to men and women are determined by a 
competitive marriage market - what you call the supply demand framework.”  
 
•  Different Order of Presentation and Subsection Titles. In the 1973 JPE 
article graphical D&S models are presented regardless of cultural context. 
In contrast, in the Treatise, such models appear only in the chapter on 
polygamy.  
 
Readers who learned BTM only from the Treatise, and are not particularly interested in 
polygamy, may very well have skipped the chapter on polygamy, or just skimmed it. 
They would have paid attention mostly to the chapter on assortative mating and invested 
more in learning Becker’s formally presented optimal sorting models than his graphical 
D&S models presented in the previous chapter on polygamy.    7
In contrast, it is in a section entitled ‘division of output between mates’ that the 
first JPE article presents analyses of D&S in marriage markets.
9 The reader who studies 
the JPE articles on marriage finds it difficult to escape the conclusion that D&S models 
of marriage markets are of primary importance in influencing the way that marital output 
is divided between husbands and wives in any society, regardless of whether it is 
polygamous or monogamous. In contrast, the Treatise does not include a section entitled 
‘The division of output between mates’ containing an explicit D&S graph applied to the 
distribution problem. The conclusion that Becker’s theory of marriage explains the 
distribution of marital output between husband and wife was easy to reach from Becker’s 
JPE articles on marriage, but the reader whose first exposure to Becker’s theory of 
marriage consists of reading the Treatise is unlikely to conclude that competitive D&S 
models can explain the relative access of men and women to goods consumed in 
marriage. From reading the Treatise’s discussion of the division of marital output in 
monogamous societies, and not the 1973 JPE article, an economist familiar with more 
conventional applications of D&S analysis is less likely to gain a clear understanding of 
how D&S affects distribution of goods produced in marriage. The Treatise contains a 
section called ‘Equilibrium income, investments, and sex ratio’, but not all readers may 
realize that equilibrium incomes correspond to a division of output between husband and 
wife. Furthermore, this discussion is found in the chapter on polygamy, not in the chapter 
on assortative mating in monogamous countries. Statements found in the Treatise, such 
as “The bumping of lower-quality men out of their marriages through competitive 
reductions in the incomes of higher-quality men continues until the incomes of the 
lowest-quality men are reduced to their single levels”, indicate that supply and demand of 
brides and grooms influences distribution of marital output, but the connection is not as 
obvious as it would be to a careful reader of the 1973 JPE article.  
 
•  Disappearance of some D&S terms familiar to labor economists. In the 
first JPE article, the section on the marriage market and sorting of mates 
includes statements that appear directly imported from labor economics, as 
the ones on salaries and opportunity cost cited in the previous section. 
Even though the Treatise reproduces many other paragraphs from the 
same section of the JPE article in which the D&S jargon appeared 
(including numerical examples of optimal sorting), this jargon does not 
appear in the Treatise’s chapters on marriage markets.  It is therefore to be 
expected that readers of the JPE articles familiar with traditional D&S 
analysis would be more likely to understand that BTM deals with intra-
marriage distribution than readers getting their only exposure to Becker’s  
theory of marriage from the Treatise.  
 
I conclude that in the first JPE article Becker gave more prominence to D&S 
models of marriage markets than he did in chapters 3 and 4 of the 1981 version of the 
                                                 
9 Other subsections in this article are entitled: ‘the gain from marriage’, and ‘the marriage market and 
sorting of mates’. The second JPE article (1974) includes a section entitled ‘love, caring, and marriage,’ a 
short section on polygamy (2 ½ pages, in contrast to an entire chapter in the Treatise
 ), a section on 
assortative mating and natural selection, and a section on life-cycle marital patterns that includes an 
economic analysis of search in marriage markets.   8
Treatise. Parallelly to the reduced emphasis on D&S models, a comparison between the 
1973 and 1981 versions of BTM indicates increased prominence of optimal sorting 
models. In the Treatise, Becker expands optimal sorting models and integrates elements 
of D&S analysis into an optimal sorting model that he calls an equilibrium sorting model. 
Here is an example of a statement consistent with D&S analysis found in a section on 
sorting (in the chapter on assortative mating): “This analysis shows that the equilibrium 
income and mate assigned to any person by the optimal sorting depends not only on his 
traits but also on the traits of everyone else in the marriage market.” (Becker 1981, p. 80)  
The Treatise offers a few more economic analyses of marriage. The chapter on 
altruism in the family (chapter 8 in Becker 1981) contains a few examples of negotiations 
between husband and wife assuming an altruistic decision-maker; the chapter on families 
in nonhuman species (chapter 9 in Becker 1981) presents some analogies between mating 
among humans and among other species; chapter 10 deals with divorce; and chapter 11 
offers some explanations for changes in family characteristics in a number of 
industrialized countries in the period between 1950 and 1978. In this chapter Becker 
writes that the growth of U.S. women’s earning power is the major cause of the following 
changes: lower fertility, growth in lone motherhood, higher divorce rates, higher labor 
force participation of married women, and higher school enrollment rates for women.
10  
The importance of D&S models in Becker’s opus on marriage is also apparent 
from the economic analysis of divorce that he co-authored with Robert T. Michael and 
Elizabeth Landes and that appeared in 1977. This article tested a number of predictions 
derived from Becker’s D&S models of marriage and from related search models, such as 
the prediction that individuals with rare characteristics may be less attractive relative to 
people with more generally desired characteristics. In a market equilibrium their gain 
from marriage may be lower and therefore they may be more likely to divorce.
11 This 
article also develops the idea that individuals invest in human capital related to 
productivity in marriage. The concept of marriage-specific investments is presented, by 
which the authors mean ‘an investment that raises the output produced in a particular 
marriage,’ reinforcing the tie between Becker’s economics of marriage and Becker’s 
theoretical work on human capital (see Becker 1964).
12 Earlier work by economists in the 
New Home Economics had also analyzed wives’ investments in their husband’s human 
capital, and vice-versa, husbands’ investments in their wife’s human capital (Lee Benham 
1974 and Michael Grossman 1976). 
Next, I examine the contributions of other economists to the economic analysis of 
marriage in the two periods: 1970-1979 and 1980-1993. This survey is then analyzed 
with an eye on establishing the extent of Becker’s leadership in this field.  
 
 
                                                 
10 This conclusion has brought Becker the ire of a number of female economists, including Barbara 
Bergmann (1995) and Frances Woolley (1996). 
11 Other predictions derived and tested in Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) follow from search theory: 
information is imperfect prior to marriage and divorces are most likely to occur in the first year of marriage 
(rather than in any later year) due to the fast accumulation of new information about the spouse right after 
the marriage. Moreover, Becker, Landes and Michael predict and confirm that shotgun marriages, i.e. 
marriages that occur after the bride gets pregnant, are more likely to end in divorce. 
12 Becker also played a pioneering role in the development of the economic analysis of human capital, other 
influential pioneers being Jacob Mincer and T.W. Schultz.    9
III. Other Economists’ Marriage Models: 1970-1993 
One sees quite a contrast between the economic models of marriage that were 
developed by economists entering the field in the 1970s (earlier entrants) and those 
developed by economists who entered the field after 1980 (later entrants). Earlier entrants 
contributed primarily D&S models of marriage and later entrants contributed primarily 
bargaining and optimal sorting models.  
 
The 1970s. Before the Treatise was published, most entrants into the field of economics 
of marriage were with Becker either at Columbia or at Chicago. One of the most 
influential earlier entrants into the economic analysis of marriage markets is Judge 
Richard Posner, who was fully employed by the law school at the University of Chicago 
and thus a colleague of Becker’s when BTM was first published (see Posner 1980). 
Posner’s Sex and Reason is a major contribution to D&S models of marriage. Not 
surprisingly, Posner uses primarily D&S models of marriage. For example, in Sex and 
Reason Posner (1992) offers D&S models of sexual behavior—including homosexuality 
and prostitution. 
Earlier entrants included many students of Becker’s, first at Columbia and then at 
Chicago. Before he left Columbia for Chicago in 1969, Becker inspired Fredericka 
Pickford-Santos to write a dissertation on the economics of marriage. Pickford-Santos’ 
theoretical framework is one of bilateral trade. The first students at Chicago who wrote 
dissertations on the economics of marriage under Becker’s supervision are Alan Freiden 
and Michael Keeley, who both published D&S analyses of marriage markets in 1974. 
Keeley built on Becker’s assumption that marriage markets establish implicit 
prices for brides, using this assumption as a stepping stone for the adoption of more  
labor market analysis tools. Keeley (1974) adapts search theory traditionally combined 
with D&S analysis of labor markets to the analysis of marriage markets, leading him to 
derive testable predictions regarding the determinants of age at marriage (see also Keeley 
1979). 
I also entered the field as a student of Becker’s at Chicago, adopted Becker’s 
concept of a marriage as a particular type of small non-profit firm similar to other non-
profit firms producing goods of a non-commercial nature, and have developed D&S 
models that analyze marriage markets.
 Following Becker’s D&S models, I assumed that 
marriage markets establish implicit prices for brides in an economic analysis of polygamy 
(Grossbard 1976). Another student at Chicago during this period who wrote articles that 
adopt Becker’s D&S models is Ivy Papps (1980).  
Becker’s D&S models of marriage have also been applied to the study of dating, 
extra-marital affairs, and marriage brokers. One of the first to adapt models to such 
questions is French economist Bertrand Lemennicier (1980, 1982, 1988), who came to 
the field in 1976 after he had read the 1973 JPE articles.  
The 1970s also saw a few articles in the New Home Economics tradition that 
modeled in-marriage human capital investments by one spouse in another. One of the first 
to develop the concept that wives invest in their husbands’ earnings capacity is Lee 
Benham (1974), a graduate of Stanford University. Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) 
also applied concepts of human capital to the economic analysis of marriage. Michael 
Grossman (1976), a student of Becker’s at Columbia in the 1960s, developed the concept 
that spouses invest in each other’s health-producing human capital. As was pointed out in   10
other writings by the founders of the New Home Economics, Becker and Mincer, D&S 
models and models of investment in human capital are complementary: to better 
understand why people invest in human capital (theirs or others’) it helps to think in terms 
of demand and supply. 
Gerald Scully (1979) was inspired by Becker’s optimal sorting model of marriage. 
 
The 1980s and early 1990s. In contrast to the domination of D&S models of 
marriage markets in the research of economists who were first exposed to Becker’s ideas 
on marriage in the 1960s and 1970s (prior to the publication of the Treatise), the models 
of marriage that experienced the most growth in the 1980s were bargaining and optimal 
sorting models contributed by researchers newly entering the field of economics of 
marriage in the 1980s. Bargaining models assume that the problems of allocation and 
production have been solved, and focus on how a couple will divide the gains of marriage 
between themselves. Bargaining models recognize that the forces of D&S operate in 
marriage markets, and have influence on power struggles between wife and husband, but 
bargaining models are more about command than about matches based on price. Market 
factors are in the background, as they affect bargaining power (market conditions affect 
threat points, using the language of some bargaining theories). 
Bargaining theorists often dissociate themselves from Becker’s unitary model (i.e. 
a model that conceives of a household as having a central decision-making mechanism 
affecting all of the household’s consumption).
13 It is interesting that bargaining theorists 
of marriage typically prefer to ignore the fact that Becker’s D&S models of marriage 
clearly address problems of distribution within marriages.
14 One of the most influential 
later entrants was Marjorie McElroy, who co-authored one of the first bargaining theories 
of marriage with Mary Jane Horney more than ten years after starting her career at Duke 
University in 1970. Another influential bargaining theory of marriage was co-authored by 
Marilyn Manser and Murray Brown, the latter a well-published professor at the State 
University of New York at Buffalo. Other bargaining models were contributed by 
Frances Woolley (1988), based on her Ph.D dissertation at the London School of 
Economics, and Paul Carlin (1985). 
A prominent later entrant is Robert Pollak. A professor at the University of 
Pennsylvania, Pollak already had acquired a reputation as a specialist on consumption 
theory. Before dealing with Becker’s theory of marriage, Pollak had published critiques 
of Becker’s theory of allocation of time, altruist model of family decision-making, and 
theory of fertility. Pollak first promoted bargaining theories as editor of the International 
Economic Review in which he published the first two influential bargaining articles in 
1980-81 (by Manser and Brown, and by Horney and McElroy). Later, after he had moved 
to the University of Washington in Seattle, his colleague Shelly Lundberg and he 
published their own bargaining model of marriage in the JPE (Lundberg and Pollak 
1993). Pollak’s dedication to criticizing Becker’s theories of the family may be related to 
                                                 
13 Until Becker’s theory of marriage, most models contributed by the New Home Economics, starting with 
Becker’s 1960 article on the economics of fertility and Jacob Mincer’s (1962) article on married women’s 
labor force participation, assumed unitary decision-making in the household. 
14 When I called Becker’s attention to this apparent oversight of the bargaining theorists of marriage, in 
January 1993, he agreed with me.    11
his self-description as a feminist economist (see Pollak 2003). As discussed below, a 
number of influential later entrants have been associated with feminist economics.  
  The focus towards two-person models was not limited to models that assume a 
bargaining process between spouses. In 1981 Patricia Apps published a Walrasian trade 
model of the household as a two-person economy in which the members engage in 
perfectly competitive trade and the member specializing in domestic production produces 
domestic goods in exchange for a wage income from the partner specializing in 
commercial work (also see Apps 1982).  
In the same year, Pierre-Andre Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Ray Rees 
(1988) published generalizations of previous two-person models in which the intra-
household exchange equilibrium was not limited to that of a bargaining model. They each 
obtained a household equilibrium that is Pareto efficient and in which the sharing of gains 
from marriage is an application of the second theorem of welfare economics. Apps and 
Rees (1988) include a generalization of Apps’ trade model that assumes household 
production. There is no household production in Chiappori’s early models. Chiappori 
called his model a collective model.
15 
Models of marriage that were published by later entrants associated with Becker 
or Chicago are also two-person models. This holds for Elizabeth Peters, a student at 
Chicago who entered the field with a model of the effects of no-fault divorce laws on 
men and women. Even though Peters assumes an implicit price established in marriage 
markets, an assumption that follows from D&S analysis of marriage (Peters 1986), her 
models are mostly household bargaining models.
16 Other models of marriage that focus 
on the conflicting goals of husband and wife are models of child custody and child 
support by Yoram Weiss and Robert Willis (1985, 1993), two economists with prior 
connections to Becker.
17 
Like Pollak, Theodore Bergstrom is a later entrant who came to the economics of 
marriage with a well-established reputation as a mathematical economist and a history of 
questioning basic assumptions underlying traditional models of D&S of private goods. 
By the time he entered the economics of marriage in 1989, Bergstrom had a long record 
of publications in major economics journals, public goods and taxation among his 
specialties. Also like Pollak, Bergstrom was an early critic of Becker’s model of altruism 
in family decision-making. Unlike Pollak, however, Bergstrom’s contributions to the 
modeling of marriage are in the area of sorting/allocation models. He has contributed 
marriage and courtship models that don’t rely on traditional D&S analysis. With David 
Lam, his colleague at the University of Michigan, Bergstrom authored a number of articles 
based on optimal sorting in marriage (Bergstrom and Lam 1989a and 1989b). This group 
produced more optimal sorting models: Lam (1988) and Bergstrom and Mark Bagnoli 
(1993).  A later entrant adopting optimal sorting models is Alessandro Cigno (1991), who 
dismisses competitive D&S models as unrealistic in their assumption that homogeneity of 
participants in marriage markets is comparable to the assumption of homogeneity in labor 
                                                 
15 For more on the differences between the intra-household exchange models of Apps and Rees and 
Chiappori, see Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997).  
16 Her principal thesis advisor was Robert Michael. 
17 Willis had become a close associate of Becker’s after he had come to Columbia for a post-doctoral 
fellowship in the 1970s and in 1985 was a professor at Chicago.   12
markets (Cigno 1991, p. 62). Another optimal sorting model was contributed by Allen 
Schirm (1987), a student of Pollak’s when he was at the University of Pennsylvania.  
These new models pulled the economics of marriage in different directions. What 
these and other later entrants have in common is that they helped move the economic 
modeling of marriage away from traditional D&S models. Nevertheless, during this 
period many earlier entrants continued to publish D&S models of marriage. Lemennicier 
went on to publish a marriage market analysis of marital infidelity (which he called 
marital mobility, Lemennicier 1982) and an analysis of personal ads in French 
newspapers (Lemennicier 1988). I published models analyzing married women’s labor 
force participation decisions: Grossbard-Shechtman (1984, 1993) presented a marriage 
market analysis leading to the derivation of sex ratio effects on labor supply, and 
Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana Neuman (1988) presented a marriage market 
analysis that leads to the derivation of compensating differentials in marriage. There were 
also D&S models of choice between formal marriage and cohabitation (Grossbard-
Shechtman 1982) and of religious intermarriage (Grossbard-Shechtman 1983). Also in 
the D&S tradition is Yehoshua Liebermann’s (1983) analysis of dowry among Jews. 
Liebermann had also been a student at Chicago in the 1970s. 
Furthermore, during this period a number of scholars followed Lee Benham 
(1974) and Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) in applying concepts of human capital to 
the economic analysis of marriage. These include Lawrence Kenny (1983), Grossbard-
Shechtman (1986), Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana Neuman (1986, 1991), Carmel 
Chiswick and Evelyn Lehrer (1990), and Lehrer and Chiswick (1993). All these 
contributions were made by at least one author who had studied with Becker (Kenny and 
Chiswick). 
 
IV. Why were D&S models of marriage replaced? 
A major difference between the earlier and later entrants is that most entrants in the 
1970s were principally using D&S models, in which implicit prices play a central role, 
whereas most later entrants were principally using bargaining and optimal sorting 
models, in which (implicit) prices play a limited role.
18 To the extent that they used D&S 
concepts, later entrants relegated D&S models of marriage to a secondary role: as support 
for bargaining or optimal sorting models. What accounts for this paradigm shift in the 
economics of marriage after 1980? 
 
•  A first explanation is that Becker’s leadership position in the field and the 
marginalization of D&S models of marriage in Becker’s Treatise 
encouraged other scholars also to marginalize D&S models of marriage 
and to disregard Becker’s models that made it into the JPE articles but not 
into the Treatise.   
 
By the time the Treatise was published in 1981, Becker had clearly achieved 
extraordinary prominence in the field, and whatever ideas he decided to exclude from the 
Treatise had less impact on other economists than the ideas he included. Becker seems to 
                                                 
18 One of the earliest bargaining models of marriage was authored by a post-doc whom Becker invited to 
the department of economics at Chicago in the mid-1970s, Louis Wilde. Wilde, who later took a job at Cal 
Tech, presented a Nash equilibrium model of marriage in Becker’s workshop in 1975-76.   13
have pushed D&S to a minor position in the Treatise for reasons independent of the 
evolution of the economics profession and the evolution of the economics department at 
Chicago in particular. Readers who did not know Becker perceived the Treatise as 
Becker’s last word on marriage and family and a replacement for the earlier JPE articles. 
The title “Treatise” added to this perception. Economists rarely call their books 
treatises.
19 The other famous Treatise in economics is that by John Maynard Keynes. 
Many economists understood the title A Treatise on the Family to imply disregard 
for work that Becker had previously published about the family. Some drew parallels 
between the Keynesian revolution in macro-economics and the Beckerian revolution in 
studies of the family. Scholars entering the economics of marriage in the 1980s may not 
have paid much attention to the additional D&S model and the labor economics jargon 
found in the 1973 JPE article, but avoided in the Treatise.
20 
In fact, Becker did not call this book a Treatise in order to signal its role as a 
vehicle for his ultimate message on the economics of marriage and the family. What led 
Becker to name his book a Treatise was his ambition to attract the interest of sociologists 
who would have avoided a book entitled ‘Economics of…’or any similar title. In the late 
1970s, when Becker was working on the Treatise and Becker’s work was being published 
exclusively in economics venues, sociologists had not yet taken an interest in Becker’s 
ideas about the family. This even holds for his sociology colleagues at Chicago (see 
Grossbard-Shechtman 1981).  
At the time the Treatise was being prepared there was some antagonism to 
Becker’s entry into subject matter traditionally in the domain of sociologists (see, for 
instance, Remi Clignet and Joyce Sween 1977). Given that the family has traditionally 
been a topic studied by sociologists, Becker wanted the Treatise to make his theory of 
marriage more appealing to sociologists.
21 It is this desire to appeal to non-economists 
that led Becker to choose the title ‘Treatise’.
22  
This motivation to reach out to sociologists also led Becker to avoid statements 
likely to alienate readers reluctant to apply traditional D&S analysis to marriage 
problems. Anticipating the discomfort that potential readers trained in sociology would 
experience with some of the D&S jargon used in the JPE article, Becker eliminated it in 
the Treatise.  
 
•  A second explanation for the decreased importance of D&S models after 
1980 is that in contrast to the mostly inexperienced students entering the 
economics of marriage in the 1970s, many of the later entrants were 
scholars with a well-established reputation in more traditional economics 
and an inclination for controversial fields of study. This applies to Pollak 
and Bergstrom.  
 
Both Bergstrom and Pollak are prominent economists with an anti-Beckerian intellectual 
history and a proclivity for unusual causes. Whereas Pollak has been active in feminist 
                                                 
19 This feedback was contributed by Sarah Hamersma from the University of Florida.  
20 I thank Scott Drewianka and Lawrence Kenny for pointing this out. 
21 Prior to the publication of the Treatise, very few sociologists had heard of Becker’s theories on marriage 
and family.  
22 Personal communication from Gary Becker, 1975 or 1976.   14
causes (he is one of the few men to have served on the board of the Committee for the 
Status of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP)), in recent years Bergstrom has 
actively tried to foster competition in journal publishing.  
Pollak and Bergstrom have been particularly influential in the economics of 
marriage. An indicator of their influence is that they have published review articles on the 
economics of marriage: Lundberg and Pollak (1996) on bargaining in marriage, and 
Bergstrom (1996) mostly on sorting in marriage. The former appeared in the Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, and the latter in the Journal of Economic Literature, two primary 
outlets for review articles in economics.  
  Both Pollak and Bergstrom have used game theoretical models. It is in the late 
1970s that game theories started to become more popular among economists, implying a 
loss of popularity for the particular game that is at the core of traditional D&S analysis: 
the competitive market model. Theorists were looking for ways to apply new game 
theories. Marriage seemed to offer good opportunities to apply such theories.  
While bargaining theorists of marriage like to see themselves in opposition to 
BTM, Becker has recognized the value of bargaining theories of marriage. He has invited 
to Chicago at least three scholars who have applied bargaining theories to marriage: 
Wilde, McElroy, and Chiappori. McElroy entered the field of marriage after visiting 
Chicago, upon Becker’s invitation, in 1977-78. During that time, she had the opportunity 
to absorb some lessons about D&S models. In Becker’s (2004) words: “When Marjorie 
gave a talk to the applications workshop on her paper on marriage bargaining prior to its 
publication, I jumped on her for not including market forces.” Nevertheless, D&S 
analysis plays a limited role in her bargaining model of marriage. Pollak was invited to 
present his ideas about Becker’s theories of the family at a conference honoring Becker at 
Chicago.  
 
•  A third explanation is that the shift from D&S models to bargaining 
models may have been partially motivated by feminist ideals regarding 
fairness in marriage. 
 
The major focus of bargaining theories is intra-marriage distribution. This topic tends to 
be of great interest to women. Many of the bargaining analysts are women. Of the four 
authors of two influential early articles on bargaining in marriage three are women 
(McElroy, Manser, and Horney). At least one of the later entrants, Frances Woolley, 
published a critique of Becker’s Treatise in Feminist Economics (Woolley 1996) and 
later served as president of the International Association for Feminist Economics that 
publishes Feminist Economics. Robert Pollak, a critic of Becker’s economic models of 
the family, calls himself a feminist economist who builds neoclassical models that 
include considerations that Becker omitted, in contrast to other feminist economists who 
have rejected Becker’s neoclassical models without providing alternatives (see Pollak 
2003). 
However, it is not clear that more women entered the field in the 1980s than in the 
1970s. It is noteworthy that throughout the entire period studied here one observes a large 
concentration of women among all junior economists entering the study of marriage, 
relative to the number of women in economics in general. In the 1970s, a relatively high 
proportion of Becker’s students writing on marriage were women (although in more   15
recent decades, most of Becker’s students writing on marriage have been men).
 23 It is 
possible that throughout the entire period women were attracted to the analysis of 
marriage out of concern for fairness in marriage. However, one does not need bargaining 
models to study the degree of fairness in marriage; the same idealistic concerns about 
fairness in marriage can be studied via D&S models. 
Feminist economists’ antagonism toward Becker’s work on the family started 
before the Treatise was published. Feminist economists were among the first critics of 
BTM (see Marianne Ferber and Bonnie Birnbaum 1977). This antagonism (evident from 
Barbara Bergmann’s (1995) article published in the first issue of Feminist Economics) 
may have dissuaded some potential new entrants from studying the economics of 
marriage with Becker, thereby cutting some of the supply of potential entrants in the field 
via Chicago.  
 
•  A fourth explanation is that earlier entrants were mostly Columbia and 
Chicago people who naturally felt attracted to D&S models. Of the two 
types of marriage models that Becker’s Chicago students were exposed to 
in the 1970s, the D&S and the optimal sorting models, these students were 
probably more comfortable with D&S models also taught in many of their 
classes (including price theory classes by Milton Friedman and Gary 
Becker and a course on industrial organization taught by George Stigler.) 
In contrast, few of the later entrants were Chicago people. This holds for 
Bergstrom, Bourguignon, Brown, Chiappori, Lehrer, Lundberg, Neuman, 
and Pollak.  
 
The lesser role of Chicago scholars helps explain the reduced importance of D&S 
models, given that traditionally the Chicago School of economics promoted D&S models. 
The small number of entrants from Chicago after the first decade of economics of 
marriage could be related to other changes in the economics department at the University 
of Chicago. It is possible that Friedman’s retirement from teaching in the mid 1970s 




V. About Becker’s Persistent Leadership in Economics of Marriage 
In his first article on the economics of marriage published in 1973, Becker 
featured primarily D&S models. Likewise, most other economists entering the field in the 
1970s—principally students and colleagues of Becker--produced D&S models. Becker’s 
leadership in economics of marriage in the 1970s was obvious. Becker’s leadership in 
economics of marriage continued in the 1980s and early 1990s, even though he 
essentially stopped publishing in this field after the Treatise on the Family appeared in 
1981. One indication of Becker’s continued influence can be seen in the supply of sorting 
                                                 
23 Even in the 1960s, when Becker was at Columbia, he and Mincer attracted a disproportionately high 
percentage of female dissertation writers (see Fuchs 1994). It should be remembered that in the 1960s and 
1970s a very low proportion of all Ph.D. students in economics were women. 
24 Friedman’s graduate course in microeconomics, which he tellingly called a course on price theory, also 
served as a stage from which Friedman enthusiastically defended the price mechanism and attacked the 
command principle of organization. A number of students in my class, including myself, were deeply 
affected by Friedman’s enthusiasm.    16
models that followed Becker’s increased coverage of these models. Even though the  
increase in the popularity of bargaining models did not follow Becker’s example, it can 
also be interpreted as indirect evidence of Becker’s influence. Optimal sorting and 
bargaining models are complements: the first deal with allocation and production, the 
second with distribution. After the traditional models of D&S that dominated Becker’s 
early work on marriage were replaced by sorting models, models that don’t deal much 
with distribution, it was necessary to bring in other models that dealt with distribution. 
This was not necessary with D&S models that simultaneously address problems of 
allocation, distribution, and production.  
Some of the motivation behind new models of marriage in the 1980s and early 
1990s came from discontent with Becker’s theories and possibly from a view that 
Becker’s theory of marriage was inconsistent with feminist ideals. Developers and users 
of bargaining models of marriage often dissociate themselves from Becker’s theories of 
the family. These authors dissociate themselves from earlier models of Becker, but not 
from the original models that Becker pioneered in order to analyze marriage: D&S 
models of marriage that address the problem of distribution in a manner similar to that of 
bargaining models.  
None of the challengers to Becker’s leadership in this field seems to have 
dominated the economics of marriage by the end of the period covered here: 1993. In the 
last twelve years since then there have been many more entrants into the field, and most 
of the later entrants described here are still active. The field has experienced a 
considerable expansion beyond the scope of this article. A quick look at the economics of 
marriage today does not reveal any new leaders of Becker’s stature. More than thirty 
years after the publication of Becker’s first article on the economics of marriage, and 
twenty-five years after Becker stopped producing in this field, it is my impression that 
Becker remains the primary leader in economics of marriage. Relatively strong 
continuing sales of the Treatise are consistent with this impression, and so is the large 
number of citations of that book in current articles on marriage. Is the extent of this 
leadership unusual?  
Becker pioneered the economics of marriage in the same sense that he has 
pioneered a number of other new applications of economics. Becker’s pioneering 
leadership role was recognized by the prestigious Nobel Prize Committee (1992) and by 
Victor Fuchs (1994) in the widely read Journal of Economic Perspectives. In particular, 
Becker can also be considered a pioneer in law and economics and in health economics.  
A first glance at such ‘intra-Becker’ comparison reveals a contrast between the 
enormous growth of these other applications of economics relative to the more limited 
growth in economics of marriage during the period under study here. The American Law 
and Economics Association had over 400 members in the mid 1990s (Fuchs 1994).
25 
Health economics had become an influential field of economic research, with its own 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) program and hundreds of economists 
active in this field. In contrast, no NBER program or professional organization was 
founded for economics of marriage, not by 1993 and not by 2005.  
It is my impression that Becker is more likely to be cited in an article on marriage 
(by an economist or a sociologist) than in an article on health or law, an impression 
shared by Becker (Becker 2005).  The institutional differences between economics of 
                                                 
25 William Landes and Richard Posner also pioneered the field of law and economics.   17
marriage and other new applications of economics pioneered by Becker are correlated 
with the presence of many other prominent economists in these other fields and the  
establishment of study programs in these other fields in economics departments, law 
schools, schools of public health, and schools of public policy. Economics of marriage is 
a smaller field, and Becker has fewer competitors for the mantle of leadership (see 
Grossbard-Shechtman 2001a).  
Much of the current research on family is performed by sociologists who may 
find the newer writings in economics of the family more difficult to access than Becker’s 
Treatise. Becker’s efforts at reaching out to sociologists of marriage were hugely 
successful: Becker has achieved undeniable prominence among quantitative sociologists 
and demographers studying marriage. That the study of marriage is primarily a field 
dominated by sociologists helps explain Becker’s enormous prominence in quantitative 
research on marriage, whether generated by sociologists or economists. Few articles on 
marriage by sociologists or demographers are currently published without a reference to 
Becker. One of the reasons that Becker is among the most cited economists in the world 
is that his citations also come from social scientists outside economics (not only those 
who write on marriage), and sociologists tend to cite more than economists (see 
Grossbard-Shechtman 2001b).  
When the University of Chicago awarded Becker the Phoenix Award in the social 
sciences in 2002, Milton Friedman gave a talk during which he called Becker the greatest 
social scientist of the century. Friedman also had this to say about my comparison 
between Keynes’ General Theory and Becker’s Treatise on the Family: “As to the 
comparison with Keynes' General Theory, the two books are comparable in terms of the 
kind of influence they had on the particular field of analysis. Both are very largely 
theoretical and yet concerned with very practical problems, yet there is an enormous 
difference between them. Keynes is concerned with the economy as a whole, the very 
broadest subjects of analysis, while Gary is concerned with some of the narrowest 
subjects of analysis: of what happens on the level of the family, of the married couple; so 
they are very different in their scope.” (Friedman 2004). 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
What has been uncovered here is that in the area of economics of marriage Becker 
has been a leader in two senses: he pioneered the field and he has exerted a considerable 
influence on the work of other economists who entered this field in the period 
surrounding the publication of his pioneering analyses of marriage (1970-1993).  
D&S models of marriage have the following advantages over other theories:  (1) 
simplicity, (2) simultaneous resolution of allocation, production, and distribution 
problems, and (3) bridges with labor economics, a more established field of inquiry. 
Becker’s first JPE model of marriage was principally an application of D&S analysis to 
marriage. Some of that analysis was not included in the Treatise and tends to be 
forgotten. I hope that by clarifying that Becker stands by his earlier D&S models of 
marriage, this article will generate renewed interest in D&S models of marriage.  
It is hoped that future research will help us gain a better understanding of the 
determinants of intellectual leadership in general and of Becker’s leadership in particular, 
both in economics and in other social sciences. 
   18
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